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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                              
No. 07-4220
                              
DARLENE JONES,
                               Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
                              
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 06-cv-01778)
District Judge:  Honorable Gene E. K. Pratter 
                              
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 18, 2008
Before: AMBRO, FUENTES and FISHER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed:  April 28, 2008)
                              
OPINION
                              
PER CURIAM
Darlene Jones appeals the District Court’s decision affirming the Commissioner’s
denial of her request for benefits.  We will affirm.
           In May 2003, Jones filed applications for disability insurance benefits and
2supplemental security income.  Jones alleged disability because of hepatitis C, high blood
pressure, depression and knee and lumbar impairments.  After Jones’ applications were
denied, she received a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).  The ALJ
found that Jones was not disabled under the Social Security Act and the Appeals Council
denied her request for review. 
The ALJ found that Jones had medically determinable lumbar, knee, hepatitis C
and depression impairments.  Although these constituted a “severe” combination of
impairments under the regulations, the ALJ found at step three of the five-step sequential
evaluation that they did not equal a Listed Impairment.  See Ramirez v. Barnhart, 372
F.3d 546, 550-51 (3d Cir. 2004) (describing 5-step process).  Rather, the ALJ determined
that Jones retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform the functional
demands of a restricted range of sedentary level exertional work.  According to the ALJ,
while Jones was incapable of performing her past relevant work, she was capable of
making an adjustment to work which exists in significant numbers in the national and
regional economy.  The District Court, adopting the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation over Jones’ objections, affirmed the Commissioner’s decision. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3), which
incorporates 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) by reference.  We have jurisdiction over Jones’ appeal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review of the District Court’s legal
conclusions.  Allen v. Barnhart, 417 F.3d 396, 398 (3d Cir. 2005).  We review the factual
      Jones’ argument that she is disabled because of the number of medications she takes1
was not raised in the District Court and is therefore waived.  See Krysztoforski v. Chater,
55 F.3d 857, 860-61 (3d Cir. 1995) (per curiam).  
3
findings in the ALJ’s decision for substantial evidence.  Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d
546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005).
On appeal, Jones, proceeding pro se, does not raise any legal issues and only
alleges that she is disabled because she has impairments and takes medication.  We will
assume that Jones is attempting to challenge the District Court’s legal conclusions and the
ALJ’s factual findings regarding her disability.   We agree with the District Court and1
will adopt its reasoning.
There was substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s conclusion that
Jones’ reduced bilateral grip strength, possible left-sided carpal tunnel syndrome and
obesity were not severe impairments.  See Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir.
2001).  Further, there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that the
evidence in Jones’ medical records discredited her subjective complaints regarding the
severity of her back pain.  The ALJ properly considered, discussed and weighed the
relevant evidence pertaining to Jones’ disability allegations.  Id. at 42.  
The District Court also properly concluded that Jones’ obesity was factored
indirectly into the ALJ’s decision based on her doctors’ opinions.  See Rutherford, 399
F.3d at 552-53.  Further, while Jones took issue with a discrepancy between the
Vocational Expert’s testimony and the examples of jobs the ALJ found she could
4perform, there is substantial evidence to support the finding that Jones is able to perform
a limited range of sedentary work and that such work exists in the national economy.  See
42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B); see also Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501,
505-06 (3d Cir. 2004) (the three enumerated occupations in ALJ’s report are merely
examples and not a complete list of the sedentary work claimant can perform).
Finally, the ALJ’s RFC finding is also supported by substantial evidence and the
hypothetical question posed to the Vocational Expert accurately reflected Jones’ clearly
established physical and mental impairments.  See Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 123
(3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 1984)).  The
ALJ also properly considered Jones’ ability to handle stress in assessing her RFC to
perform work.  
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
            
